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 of Motivations, monitoring technologies, and pay for
performance
Antonio Cordella a, Tito Cordella b,∗
a ISIG, Department of Management, London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom
b Development Economics (DEC), The World Bank, 1818 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20433, USA
a b s t r a c t
Monitoring technologies and pay for performance (PFP) contracts are becoming popular 
solutions to improve public services delivery. Their track record is however mixed. To show 
why this may be the case, this paper develops a principal agent model where agents’ motivations 
vary and so the effectiveness of monitoring technologies. In such a set-up, it shows that: (i) 
monitoring technologies should be introduced only if agents’ motivations are poor; (ii) optimal 
PFP contracts are non-linear/non-monotonic in agents’ motivations and monitoring 
effectiveness; (iii) investments aimed at improving agents’ motivations and monitoring quality 
are substitutes when agents are motivated, complements other-wise; (iv) if the agents’ “type” is 
private information, the more and less motivated agents could be separated through a menu of 
PFP/non-PFP contracts, designed in a way that only the less motivated ones choose the PFP.
1. Introduction
In the last two decades, governments across the world have invested massively in monitoring and reporting technologies
to improve the quality of public service delivery. The idea that such technologies promote efﬁciency gained increasing
1
The article will appear in a forthcoming issue of Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,. This is a version of th
author-accepted manuscript.
Please cite as follows:
Cordella, Antonio and Cordella, Tito (2017) Motivations, monitoring technologies, and pay for performance. Journal
Economic Behavior & Organization, 133 . pp. 236-255. ISSN 0167-2681consensus in managerial circles, and it quickly spread to private companies and multilateral organizations.
But what are the channels through which monitoring and reporting technologies contribute to an improvement in public
sector performance and to the provision of better services? According to the New Public Management (NPM hereinafter)
school, the road to efﬁciency is paved by the three “Ms”: markets, managers and measurement (Ferlie et al., 1996); and
 We would like to thank David Rosenblatt, James Trevino, Andrea Zambrano, two anonymous referees, as well as participants at the 2015 LACEA
Labor Network and Annual Conference for helpful comments and suggestions. Anderson Ospino Rojas provided outstanding research assistance. The usual
disclaimers apply.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: a.cordella@lse.ac.uk (A. Cordella), tcordella@worldbank.org (T. Cordella).
1 For instance, at the World Bank increased attention is being paid on “deliverology,” that is, on how to maximize the developmental impact of the
different programs by taking into account the incentives of the different stakeholders.
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reasurement is what markets and managers have to rely upon to be able to exert control and enforce pay for performance
PFP hereinafter) contracts.2 While a lot has been written on the effects of the introduction of PFP on the productivity of
ublic sector organizations (Frey et al., 2013; Moynihan and Pandey, 2010; Weibel et al., 2010), much less has been written
n the impact of investments made to increase measurability in public sector PFP schemes. This is quite surprising when
any large ICT investments have been justiﬁed on the premise that enhanced monitoring and reporting technologies are
ey elements to improve organizational performances (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2003; Dunleavy and Carrera, 2013; Garicano
nd Heaton, 2010).
To better understand the trade-offs associated with performance measurability, this paper provides a simple theoretical
ramework to analyze the channels through which monitoring and reporting technologies may (or may not) increase the
ffectiveness of PFP schemes. The discussion of the relationships between PFP, agents’ motivations, and organization perfor-
ance, in the context of public sector organization, is attracting increasing interest in the economic literature (see, among
thers, Dixit, 2002; Akerlof and Kranton, 2005; Besley and Ghatak, 2005, and Prendergast, 2008). This literature focuses on
he impact of non-monetary incentives on agents’ performances and concludes that the effects of incentives schemes on
erformance may be ambivalent when agents have multiple motivations.
This paper contributes to this debate considering a stylized framework in which the measurement of outcomes is costly,
nd the alignment between the objectives of the agents and those of the principal is only partial. In such a set up, we show
hat (i) it is optimal for the principal to introduce a monitoring and reporting technology only if the latter does not impose a
oo high burden on the agents, and/or if the agents are not sufﬁciently motivated; (ii) the design of an effective PFP contract
s complicated, and the optimal contract is highly non linear and/or non monotonic both in agents’ motivations and in the
cost” of the monitoring and reporting technology; (iii) investments aimed at improving agents’ motivations and the quality
f the monitoring and reporting technology are complements when agents are highly motivated and substitutes when they
re not; (iv) if the agents’ “type” is private information, an effective way for the principal to separate the more motivated
rom the less motivated agents is to offer a menu of contracts designed in a way that only the latter choose the PFP.
The above ﬁndings may shed a new light on the ﬁerce debate on public administration reforms and on the role played
y e-government investments aimed at increasing performance measurability and hence transparency and accountability
f public sector organizations (Barzelay, 2001; Bertot et al., 2010; Dunleavy et al., 2005; Pina et al., 2007). On one side, NPM
dvocates argue that investments in technologies that increase performancemeasurability boost organizations’ productivity
y facilitating the alignment of public servants’ motivations with predeﬁned organizational objectives (Aral et al., 2012; Ba
t al., 2001). NPM advocates also point at the increasing popularity of PFP and e-government projects around the world as a
easure of their success.3 On the opposite side, NPM critics argue that the increasing reliance of government programs on
FP schemes is a fad driven by consulting ﬁrms,which by nomeans is justiﬁed by the actual record of PFP or of e-government
olutions.4
Our own reading of the literature is that, overall, the adoption of PFP schemes and the diffusion of e-government programs
n the public sector has delivered mixed outcomes. Our model, suggesting that no one-size-ﬁts-all solution exists, may thus
rovide a clear rationale for why this may be the case.
Of course, we are not the ﬁrst who have looked at performance measurability in a principal agent framework; our
odel builds upon Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991),5 which ﬁrst suggested that if agents have to perform multiple tasks,
ome monitorable and some not, incentive based contracts, which (necessarily) focus on the latter, may induce agents to
eallocate effort in an inefﬁcient way. Given that most of the goals associated with the actions of public sector organizations
re by nature not univocal and cannot always be planned and deﬁned before their executions (Moore, 1995; Alford and
ughes, 2008), it is difﬁcult to map them in performance indicators (Propper and Wilson, 2003; Behn, 1998 2003). Baker
2002), Langbein (2010), and LeGrand (2010) provide comprehensive discussions of the costs and beneﬁts of using PFPwhen
oals are not univocal and/or quantiﬁable and performance indicators are difﬁcult to establish. However, to our knowledge,
here is no contribution that discusses how investments in monitoring and reporting technologies affect the enforcement
f PFP schemes in such an environment.
Our main contribution to this literature is in modeling explicitly the costs associated with the introduction of monitoring
nd reporting technologies – the costs of managerial attention, according to Halac and Prat (2014) – and in studying how the
nteraction between such costs and agents’ motivations affects the optimal PFP scheme. Agents’ motivations, in our view, are
ndeed a critical factor to take into consideration when discussing PFP. In this dimension, we build upon Dixit (2002) who
mphasizes thatmanypublic sector employees (judges, teachers, doctors, socialworkers)may share some “idealistic or ethic
urpose served by the agency” (p. 715). Starting from such a premise, Delfgaauw and Dur (2008) show that a PFP system,
ffering steep incentives to the more dedicated workers, may help attract them to the public sector. Our model shares some
f Delfgaauw and Dur’s (2008) features. However, in our set-up, performance assessment schemes detract resources from
2 See Picot et al. (1996).
3 See, for instance, OECD (2005).
4 See, Perry et al. (2009) and Prendergast (2015) for a comprehensive discussions of the effects of PFP schemes on public sector organizations and of the
easons why performance-related pay may fail to affect their performance.
5 For a comprehensive survey to the theoretical and empirical work on the provision of incentives in ﬁrms, see Prendergast (1999).
the ultimate goals of the agency,6 and this leads us to reach the opposite conclusions, that is, PFP may end up inducing the
more motivated agents to leave the organization. This phenomenon may also be seen as a reﬂection of tensions between
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, as in Kreps (1997), and Benabou and Tirole (2003).
Another insight of this paper, namely the fact that optimal PFPand theassociated investments inmonitoring and reporting
technologies have to be tailored according to output measurability, is also in line with empirical evidence. Hasnain and
Pierskalla (2012), in an up to date and comprehensive survey of the (empirical) literature, ﬁnd evidence that, when tasks are
simple and outcomes observable, the use of PFP is more effective; at the same time, monitoring and reporting technologies
are also more valuable in supporting PFP schemes (Ciborra, 1996) both because of moral hazard (i.e., incentive) and adverse
selection (i.e., sortingmore ableworkers, Lazear, 2000) considerations. Instead,when tasks are complex and outputs difﬁcult
to measure, the introduction of PFP schemes and the use of monitoring and reporting technologies can create distortions on
incentives (e.g., discouraging the most motivated workers) or foster the wrong type of sorting. This means that the decision
of whether to adopt PFP schemes, their optimal design, and the decision of how much to invest in monitoring and reporting
technologies should take all these effects into consideration.
A less abstract description of the kind of problems we address, and a spicier ﬂavor of our main results, may be derived
from the following two examples, one in health care and the other in education. Consider ﬁrst a hospital director who wants
to improve the quality of patients’ care that, simplifying, depends on the number of hours doctors work and on the quality of
the care they provide. Assume that hours are observable but quality not. In order to improve doctors’ incentives, the director
may consider linking their compensation not only to the hours they spend in the hospital, but also to the quality of the care
they provide. Since the latter is not directly measurable, the hospital can set up a costly monitoring and reporting system
based on the doctors’ record of how they take care of each patient, and make part of the doctors’ pay linked to the quality
of their respective records. Of course, ﬁlling a detailed record detracts precious time from actual patients’ care, so that the
optimal PFP scheme should carefully weigh the monitoring and reporting system’s costs and beneﬁts.
Consider now the case of a school principal who cares about students’ learning that, simplifying again, depends on the
number of hours kids are taught and on the quality of teaching. As before, assume that hours are observable, but quality
(of teaching) is not. In order to improve teachers’ incentives to teach well, the principal may consider linking teachers’
compensation to the results of a proﬁciency test that students are asked to take. Since the results of such a test are an
imperfect measure of what kids have actually learned at school, and the preparation of such tests is costly (in terms of hours
subtracted from actual teaching), we are again in the presence of trade-offs.7 Clearly, the more committed doctors are to
patients’ care, the more committed teachers are to education, the costlier the monitoring and reporting schemes – both in
terms of set-up expenses and administrative effort – the larger is the deadweight loss associated with the PFP schemes. An
additional cost to be taken into consideration is theone associatedwith thepossibility that themore committedprofessionals
may consider leaving workplaces where too much effort is devoted to costly performance measurement.8 These are the real
world issues that our stylized model tries to address. The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: the next section
presents the basic model, solves it both when “quality” is observable and when it is unobservable; it then considers the
case in which for quality to be observable a costly monitoring and reporting technology has to be adopted by the agent. In
Section 3, we allow the principal to invest to improve the assessment technology. In Section 4, the analysis is extended to
discuss the casewhere agents’motivations are heterogeneous, and they are not observable by the principal. Finally, Section 5
concludes.
2. The model
Assume that an organization (the principal hereinafter) wants to maximize the success of a speciﬁc activity, the quality
of education in our last example, which depends upon the contribution of two distinct but complementary components,
y and q. Let y be the component that is easy to verify/contract upon, and q the one that is not. One can think of y as a
quantitative component, the hours taught in the same example, and of q as a more qualitative one, the quality of teaching.
Output (learning in our example) is given by qy and is non observable/contractible. We further assume that the principal,
who cares about the success of the project, has a limited budget T, and he has to delegate the implementation of the activity
to a “partially motivated” agent, with limited liability.
Let discuss these last assumptions one by one. The fact that the principal faces a ﬁxed expenditure (budget) constraint
reﬂects the public, non-proﬁt, nature of the activities we have in mind; however such constraints can arise also in other
activities (see Bond and Gomes, 2009). By partially motivated agent, we mean that she does care about the principal’s
objective, but she also cares about her remuneration, and she receives negative utility from the effort she devotes to the
different components of the project. Finally,we assume that there is a lower bound to the remuneration the agent can receive
6 In the same spirit as inﬂuence/rent-seeking activities in Inderst et al. (2005).
7 Corbett and Wilson (1989) maintain that raising the testing stakes can increase teaching time dedicated to minimal curriculum development at the
expenses of students’ learning enrichment. These results are corroborated by Firestone and Pennell (1993) who highlight that greater emphasis on tests
encourage teachers to develop practices that are adverse to the advance of student learning, given time constraints.
8 This may explain why US private schools, where there is no testing, may not only attract highly qualiﬁed teachers, but can also pay them lower wages
than public schools where test preparation is becoming an increasing burden, see among others Allegretto and Tojerow (2014).
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dfor instance because of the existence of a legally binding minimum wage) and, to simplify the analysis, we assume that such
minimum wage is above the agent’s reservation utility, so that the agent’s participation constraint is never binding.
In what follows, we ﬁrst present the two extreme cases, in which q is either perfectly observable or totally unobservable,
nd discuss the optimal remuneration schemes that the principal can offer in either case. This allows us to get a clear
nderstanding of the distortions associated with incomplete contracting, and it facilitates the discussion of the third, most
nteresting, case in which q is observable, but only at a cost. In all scenarios, the principal moves ﬁrst and selects the optimal
non-renegotiable) contract bybackward induction. Thismeans that the solutionswepropose are subgameperfect equilibria.
As standard in the literature, we restrict our attention to linear contracts; in addition, to spare the reader the tedious
lgebra, in the main text we present the results in an intuitive way, and we refer the reader to Appendix for the technical
etails.
.1. Observable “quality”
To set an efﬁciency yardstick, we assume that both y and q, are monitorable/contractible. When this is the case, the
rincipal, who is interested in maximizing qy, offers a compensation package {w,k}, where w is the compensation9 per unit
f y, and k the compensation per unit of q. Denoting by subscript O the observable case, the problem of the agent can be
ritten as:
Max
y,q
UO = ˛qy + (wy + kq) −

2
(q + y)2, subject to:UO ≥ UR, (1)
here ˛>0 is a measure of the alignments between the objectives of the principal and those of the agent, wy+ kq the agent’s
emuneration, which enters linearly in the objective function, c(q, y) =(q+ y)2/2 is the cost of effort, and UR is the agent’s
eservation utility.
We further assume that the principal faces a bindingminimumwage ω¯, so thatwy + kq ≥ ω¯ and, for the sake of simplicity,
hat
UR = ω¯ = 0. (A.0)
his implies that the agent’s participation constraint is never binding at equilibrium and that the principal is unable to
xtract all the surplus from the agent.10 More importantly, we impose an upper and lower bound on the cost of effort with
espect to motivation, and we assume that
˛ ∈ (,2). (A.1)
he lower bound on the motivation parameter (vis-à-vis the cost of effort) insures that the problem is well behaved and
hat an interior solution exists. The upper bound, instead, allows us to rule out situations in which motivations are so strong
hat the agent is willing to work for free. Both assumptions simplify substantially the analysis and allow us to present clean
omparative statics results.
Solving for (1), we obtain:
y∗O(w,k) =
k(˛ − ) + w
˛(2 − ˛) , (2)
q∗O(w,k) =
w(˛ − ) + k
˛(2 − ˛) , (3)
herey∗O(w,k) andq
∗
O(w,k) denote theoptimal choicesof theagent for anygivencompensationpackage {w,q}. Theprincipal’s
roblem can now be written as:
Max
w,k
VO = q∗O(w,k)y∗O(w,k), such that:q∗O(w,k)k + y∗O(w,k)w ≤ T, (4)
he latter expression denoting the principal’s budget constraint. The solution of the problem is given by:
w∗O = k∗O =
√
T(2 − ˛)
2
, (5)
y∗O = q∗O =
√
T
, (6)2(2 − ˛)
V∗O =
T
2(2 − ˛) . (7)
9 Here we remain vague about what compensation exactly means. In a market environment, it can be the price/salary paid for each of the activities
elivered. In a non market environment, it can be the budget allocated to different teams.
10 To simplify notation, from now on we will thus disregard the participation constraint altogether.
Since the objective functions (of the principal and of the agent) are symmetric in y and q, when both components are
contractible, the optimal compensation scheme rewards them equally, so that the effort devoted to each of them is also
equalized at equilibrium.
2.2. Unobservable “quality”
We now move to the situation in which only y is observable/contractible. Designating by subscript U the unobservable
case, the problem of the agent can now be written as:
Max
y,q
UU = ˛qy + wy −

2
(q + y)2. (8)
Solving for (8), one obtains
y∗U(w) =
w
˛(2 − ˛) , (9)
q∗U(w) =
w(˛ − )
˛(2 − ˛) , (10)
where q∗U(w) and y
∗
U(w) denote the optimal choices of the agent for any given w. The problem of the principal can now be
written as:
Max
w
VU = q∗U(w)y∗U(w), such that:wy∗U(w) ≤ T, (11)
but, since the budget is given and only y is contractible, the only option for the principal is to set
w∗U = T/E[yU(w)], (12)
where E denotes the expectation operator. Assuming rational expectations, the solution of the problem is given by:
w∗U =
√
T˛(2 − ˛)

, (13)
y∗U =
√
T√
˛(2 − ˛)
, (14)
q∗U =
(˛ − )√T√
˛(2 − ˛)
, (15)
V∗U =
T(˛ − )
˛(2 − ˛) . (16)
Comparing these results with the ones in the previous section, it is immediate to verify that y∗U > y
∗
O, and q
∗
U < q
∗
O. When
compared with the situation in which both components are contractible, the agent now overdelivers on the measurable
component y, and underdelivers on the non measurable one q. Of course, the utility of the principal is lower than when both
activities are contractible, and the cost of contractual incompleteness decreases with ˛. In fact, when ˛ increases, the agent
puts additional effort on the non measurable component even if the latter is not remunerated; this results in an increase
in q∗U , relative to y
∗
U , and thus in a reduction in the distortions. This is the reason why, when ˛ increases, given (12), the
remuneration of the observable component also increases (its “supply” decreases).
2.3. Costly observable “quality”
After having brieﬂy discussed the cases in which “quality” is either perfectly observable or totally unobservable, we are
now in a position to analyze the interesting case in which, while the principal cannot observe the agent’s choice of q, he can
nonetheless introduce a costly (for the agent) monitoring and reporting technology, which allows him to infer the provision
of q. More precisely, we assume that the principal relies on a monitoring and reporting technology, s= s(q, e), that requires
an additional input, e, on the part of the agent. To keep the analysis simple, we posit that
s(q) = min{q,ˇe}. (17)
This means that the provision of q is fully “scored” in the monitoring and reporting technology if the agent devotes an
additional effort equal to e=q/ˇ, with ˇ >0, to perform a complementary activity (e.g., reporting, coaching for testing). ˇ is
thus a measure of the efﬁcacy of the monitoring and reporting technology, the larger is ˇ, the more efﬁcient the technology
is.
Notice that if e can be interpreted literally as the additional cost that the agent should bear to have its performance
assessed, it can be more generally thought of as a measure of how effectual the monitoring and reporting technology is.
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sore precisely, e can be the cost of inducing the agent to invest in a (suboptimal) but contractible technology rather than
n the optimal but not contractible one. Hence, in this case, the cost function becomes c(q, y, e) =(q+ y+ e)2. Denoting by
ubscript C the costly observable quality case, the problem of the agent can be written as:
Max
y,q,e
UC = ˛qy + (wy + kmin{q,ˇe}) −

2
(q + y + e)2, (18)
hich yields
y∗C(w,k) =
w(1 + ˇ)2 − kˇ
˛ˇ
, (19)
q∗C (w,k) =
ˇk − w
˛
, (20)
e∗C(w,k) =
ˇk − w
˛ˇ
, (21)
ith  ≡ (1 +ˇ) −˛ˇ, and  ≡2(1+ˇ) −˛ˇ. As before, y∗C(w,k), q∗C (w,k), and e∗C(w,k) denote the optimal choices of the
gent given a compensation package {w,k}. The problem of the principal can now be written as:
Max
w,k
VC = q∗C (w,k)y∗C(w,k), such that:wy∗C (w,k) + kˇe∗C(w,k) ≤ T, (22)
hich has the following solutions:
w∗C =
√
T
2(1 + ˇ) , w
∗
C = w∗U =
√
T˛(2 − ˛)

,
k∗C =
√
T(1 + ˇ)
2ˇ2
, k∗C = 0,
y∗C =
√
T
(1 + ˇ)
2
, if ˇ ≥ ¯ˇ , y∗C = y∗U =
√
T√
˛(2 − ˛)
, if ˇ < ¯ˇ ,
q∗C =
ˇ
√
T√
2(1 + ˇ)
, (or ˛ ≤ ¯˛ c); q∗C = q∗U =
(˛ − )√T√
˛(2 − ˛)
, (or ˛ > ¯˛ c);
e∗C =
√
T√
2(1 + ˇ)
, e∗C = 0,
V∗C =
Tˇ
2
, V∗PC = V∗U =
T(˛ − )
˛(2 − ˛) ,
(23)
here ¯ˇ ≡ 4(˛ − )/(2 − ˛)2, and ¯˛ C ≡ 2((1 + ˇ) −
√
1 + ˇ)/ˇ denote the (same) threshold expressed respectively in
erms of ˇ, and ˛, above or below which the principal adopts the monitoring and reporting technology.
From a simple inspection of (23) it follows that
esult 1. It is optimal for the principal to introduce a pay for performance scheme if, and only if: (i) the monitoring and reporting
echnology is efﬁcient enough (ˇ ≥ ¯ˇ ), or (ii) the agent is not sufﬁciently motivated (˛ ≤ ¯˛ C ).
It is worth remarking that we ﬁnd threshold levels of ˇ and ˛ below (or above) which the principal is better off not using
monitoring and reporting technology in a model in which the principal bears no costs (other than the costs associated to
he remuneration of the agents) in introducing such a technology. Of course, had we assumed a ﬁxed cost associated with
he introduction of the reporting system, our results would a fortiori hold true.
To get a clear intuition of the results, itmay beworth noticing that the observable andunobservable scenarios are the limit
ases for the costly observable one,whenˇ tends to inﬁnity and zero, respectively.Whenˇ is large, the distortions associated
ith the introduction of the monitoring and reporting technology tend to vanish, “quality” becomes easy to observe, and
his is reﬂected in the optimal contract. On the opposite, for sufﬁciently low values of ˇ, the cost of using reporting systems
s so high that it is in the interest of the principal to treat quality as non contractible. In other words, effort is costly for the
gent and, thus, the introduction of a performance assessment scheme for incentive purposes is justiﬁed only when it does
ot detract an excessive amount of resources from the other, productive, activity. Similarly, the distortions induced by the
ssessment scheme are justiﬁed only if the agent is not already sufﬁciently committed to the goals of the organization. If
he is, she will end up subtracting effort, which she would have otherwise devoted to the productive activity, to score better
Fig. 1. Optimal compensation package and equilibrium outcomes as a function of the effectiveness of the assessment scheme, ˇ.
in the performance assessment scheme. If these results are very intuitive, the characteristics of the optimal compensation
contract are less so. In particular, using the expressions in (23), we have11 that:
Result 2. The optimal compensation scheme has the following characteristics: (i) the remuneration w, associated with the
quantitative component y, is non linear in˛ andˇ, and nonmonotonic in˛; (ii) the remuneration k, associatedwith the qualitative
component q, is non linear in ˛ and ˇ, and non monotonic in ˇ.
The characteristics of the optimal compensation scheme are illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2 where we plot the equilibrium
value of compensation packages and the agent’s activities for different values of the effectiveness of the assessment system,
ˇ, and of the agent’s motivation ˛. More precisely, we assumed: T = 10;  =0.5; ˛=0.75 in Fig. 1, and ˇ =10 in Fig. 2. While
the choice of T is immaterial for the results, other parameters matter. We decided to chose a value of ˛ in the middle of the
feasible interval deﬁned in (A.1); in our (arbitrary) choice of ˇ and  , we just made it sure that no equilibrium outcome was
ruled out.
Looking at Fig. 1a, for a given value of ˛, when the monitoring and reporting technology is highly distortionary (i.e., for
small values of ˇ, ˇ < ¯ˇ ) it is better for the principal not to rely on it and set k* = 0, as if effort were not contractible. When
the threshold level ¯ˇ is reached, then it is optimal for the principal to adopt a performance assessment scheme. At this
point, w∗C decreases sharply and k
∗
C jumps from zero to its maximum to then decrease for higher values of ˇ. The reason for
this behavior is that when the monitoring and reporting technology is relatively costly (but not so much to discourage its
use) substantial monetary incentives are needed to convince the agent to bear the burden of the performance assessment
scheme, a burden that decreases when the monitoring and reporting technology becomes more precise. Finally, when ˇ
becomes large enough, the distortionary effects of the performance assessment scheme tend to vanish, and the two inputs
tend to be compensated in the same way.
The corresponding equilibrium levels of the different inputs are plotted in Fig. 1b. When the performance assessment
scheme is highly distortionary, and only quantity is remunerated, the agent responds to the compensation scheme by
overinvesting in the observable inputs y. When ¯ˇ is reached, y∗C makes a discrete downward jump, q
∗
C and e
∗
C a discrete
upward one. Notice that, for large values of ˇ, e∗C decreases and q
∗
C increases reﬂecting the less distortionary nature of themonitoring and reporting technology.
Moving now to Fig. 2a, for any given value of ˇ, if ˛ is small, k∗C is large, and it decreases continuously with ˛, until ¯˛ c ,
when it drops to zero and only the quantitative component is remunerated. The reason, which we already mentioned, is
11 See Appendix.
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hat since the introduction of the assessment scheme is distortionary, such distortions are worth bearing only if the agent
s not sufﬁciently motivated; in the case of highly motivated agents the assessment scheme creates an unnecessary burden.
he fact that k∗C decreases with ˛ (for ˛ ≤ ¯˛ C ) just reﬂects the fact that lower values of ˛ are associated with lower output
evels and higher (per unit) remuneration (w∗C follows the same behavior). To get a better understanding of why this is the
ase, notice that:
k∗C
w∗C
= 0, ifˇ < ¯ˇ ,
y∗C
q∗C
= k
∗
C
w∗C
= 1 + ˇ
ˇ
, ifˇ ≥ ¯ˇ ,
hich, in turn, implies that if the performance assessment scheme is introduced, its relative weight in the compensation
ackage (k∗C/w
∗
C ) is independent of the motivation of the agent, ˛, and decreases with the effectiveness of the monitoring
nd reporting technology (ˇ).
The reason is that, when the performance assessment system is used, as in standard production theory, the best the
rincipal can do is to equalize the marginal rate of technical substitution between q and y (y/q) with the (constant) economic
ate of substitution between the two factors, which is equal to 1+1/ˇ for the agent. To do so, in our set up (where the
ifferent inputs have the exact same cost in terms of effort), the principal has to ﬁx the remuneration of the two activities
ccording to the same proportion, which does not depend on ˛. Instead, what does depend on ˛ is ¯ˇ , the threshold value of
for which it is worth to adopt the performance assessment system. Since ∂ ¯ˇ /∂˛ > 0, when the agent is more motivated,
ssessment schemes that are worth implementing cannot be excessively distortionary; this is, of course, because the more
otivated the agent is, the higher is the output she produces when her effort is not contractible.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the choice of a Leontief technology for the monitoring and reporting technology
impliﬁes the analysis greatly and allows us to ﬁnd close form solutions. However, our results should hold true for more
eneral functions. For instance, take the CES technology: s(q) = (q + ˇe)1/ , if the degree of complementarity between the
wo inputs is large enough, the result that the principal would link compensation to the assessment scheme only if ˇ is
igh enough holds true by a continuity argument.12 What is crucial for our results to hold is that complementarity between
and e is high enough; the value added of a monitoring and reporting technology where q and e are substitute would
12 It is well-known that a CES converges to a Leontief when  →−∞.
necessarily be negative. This means that ﬁnding a good monitoring and reporting technology indeed requires looking for
complementarities between the unobservable inputs and what is measured in the assessment scheme.
3. Investing in technology
Until now, we have assumed that the efﬁciency of the monitoring and reporting technology is given, so that the only
choice the principal has to undertake is whether to adopt it or not. Of course, these are quite strong assumptions, and it is
interesting to see what happens in the more realistic scenario in which the principal can tailor the monitoring and reporting
technology to his needs, by deciding how much to invest in its efﬁciency. To keep the analysis simple, we assume a linear
investment technology so that the cost g(ˇ) of a monitoring and reporting technology with precision ˇ is ˇ, where  is
the (constant) marginal cost of improving precision. Since the principal moves ﬁrst, the problem of the agent is the same as
in the previous section, and the best response functions are still given by (19)–(21). The budget constraint of the principal
now becomes:
T = wy∗C (w,k) + kq∗C (w,k) − ˇ, (24)
so that his problem can be written as:
Max
w,k,ˇ
VCT = q∗C (w,k)y∗C(w,k), such that:wy∗C (w,k) + kˇe∗C (w,k) − ˇ − T ≤ 0. (25)
Solving for (25), we ﬁnd that if, in the previous case, the principal found it proﬁtable to use a monitoring and reporting
technology only if the latter was precise enough, now, when ˇ is chosen optimally, what makes the difference is how costly
it is to have a precise enough monitoring and reporting technology. Accordingly,13 we found a threshold ¯(T,˛, ), with
¯ ≡ T(2 − ˛)
3
16˛(˛ − ) , (26)
such that if, and only if, < ¯ the principal ﬁnds it optimal to use the performance assessment scheme. It isworth remarking
that
˛ >

2
⇒ ∂¯
∂˛
= T(2 − ˛)
2(22 − 2˛ − ˛2)
16˛2(˛ − )2
< 0, (27)
so that, also in this case, the more motivated the agent is, the more likely it is optimal for the principal not to adopt the
performance assessment scheme.
To illustrate the main results, we rely on Figs. 3–5, which are plotted using the same parametrization as in the previous
section.14 The ﬁrst thing that is worth noticing is that the comparative statics with respect to  (see Fig. 3) is just the mirror
image of the onewith respect toˇ (see Fig. 1). This is not surprising at all; lowmarginal costs of improving the precision of the
monitoring and reporting technology lead to a less distortionary performance assessment scheme. The comparative statics
with respect to ˛ (see Figs. 2 and 4) is also not affected qualitatively by the introduction of the investment decision. We now
turn our attention to the determinants of the investment in the monitoring and reporting technology. If, unsurprisingly,
ˇ∗C decreases monotonically with  and drops to 0, when  reaches ¯ (see Fig. 5a), the relation between the investment
in technology and the agent’s motivations may deserve a more thorough analysis. Indeed, as we prove in Appendix and
illustrate in Fig. 5b,
Result 3. The optimal investment in the precision of the monitoring and reporting technology, ˇ, is non monotonic in the
motivations ˛ of the agent: ˇ increases with ˛ until it reaches a point ¯˛ ′C (corresponding to ¯) where it drops to zero.
The reason for suchabehavior is that, asweknowfromtheprevious analysis,withmotivatedagents, theonlyperformance
schemes that are worth implementing are those that involve little distortions. This means that, the more motivated an agent
is, the more an additional investment in the precision of the monitoring and reporting technology is worth. This is, of
course, until we reach a strong enough level of motivation for which, no matter how precise the monitoring and reporting
technology, any feasible assessment scheme will just distract the agent from her duties. Assuming that an organization can
invest in improving the motivations of its employees, an interesting corollary of the result above is that:
Corollary 1. Investments aimed at improving agents’ motivations and the quality of the monitoring and reporting technology
are substitutes when agents are highly motivated and complements when the opposite is true.
4. Heterogeneous agentsFrom the previous analysis, we concluded that the design of optimal performance schemes should be tailored according
to agents’ motivations, which we assumed to be known by the principal. However, usually principals do not know how
13 See Appendix.
14 In addition, we assumed =0.1 in Fig. 3a and b.
Fig. 3. Endogenous monitoring and reporting technology: optimal compensation package and equilibrium outcomes as a function of the cost of improving
its precision, .
Fig. 4. Endogenous monitoring and reporting technology: optimal compensation package and equilibrium outcomes as a function of the agent’s
motivation, .
Fig. 5. Endogenous monitoring and reporting technology: optimal precision as a function of the cost of improving it, , and of the agent’s motivation, .
motivated agents are, and, in addition, agents tend to differ with respect to motivations. To take this into account, in this
section,we extend the analysis to discuss the casewhere agents’motivations are heterogeneous, and they are not observable
by the principal. As standard in the literature, the latter, however, knows how motivations are distributed and can offer a
menu of contracts to induce agents to reveal their type and compensate them accordingly. The kind of environment we
describe here could be an organization where a fraction p of agents is of type ˛H (high motivated), and a fraction (1−p) is
of type ˛L (low motivated), with ˛H >˛L. We further assume that ˛L < ¯˛ C < ˛H so that a PFP contract is optimal for the low
motivated agents but not for the high motivated ones. We then ask ourselves if there exists a pair of contracts {wH, kH} and
{wL, kL}, such that type ˛H prefers {wH, kH}, type ˛L prefers {wL, kL}, and the principal prefers this menu of contracts to any
pooling contract {kP,wP} that does not lead to a separation between types.
Before moving to the discussion of the separating contract, it is useful to discuss how the introduction of two different
types of agents may affect the preferences of the principal for the different contracts. Assuming that the principal has a
budget T, and he is forced to offer the same type of contract to all agents, we investigate the conditions under which he
prefers to offer a PFP contract rather than a wage only (standard) one. If he offers a standard contract, from (9) and (10) the
agents optimal response, for any given w, is given by15:
yi∗
U˜
(w) = w
˛i(2 − ˛i) , (28)
w(˛i − )
qi∗
U˜
(w) =
˛i(2 − ˛i) , (29)
15 With a slight abuse of notation, in this section, we use subscript U˜ for the wage only pooling contract (which is similar to the unobservable case
discussed above), and subscript C˜ for the performance based pooling contract (which is similar to the costly observable case discussed above).
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ith i ∈ {L, H}. The problem of the principal can now be written as:
Max
w
VU˜ = (1 − p)qL∗U˜ (w)y
L∗
U˜
(w) + pqH∗
U˜
(w)yH∗
U˜
(w), such that: (1 − p)yL∗
U˜
(w) + pyH∗
U˜
(w) ≤ T. (30)
s in the unobservable case, since the budget is given, and only y is contractible, the only option for the principal is to set
w∗U = T/E[(1 − p)yLU˜(w) + py
H
U˜
(w)], (31)
here E denotes the expectation operator. Assuming rational expectations, from (28) and (31)we have that:
w∗
U˜
=
√
T

˛L˛H(2 − ˛L)(2 − ˛H)
(1 − p)˛H(2 − ˛H) + p˛L(2 − ˛L) ; (32)
ubstituting this expression in (9) and (10) we can solve for V∗
U˜
.
Let now consider the PFP contract, for any given {w,k}, from (19) to (21), the agents’ best responses are given by:
yi∗
C˜
(w,k) = w(1 + ˇ)
2 − kˇ((1 + ˇ) − ˛iˇ)
˛iˇ(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛iˇ) , (33)
qi∗
C˜
(w,k) = ˇk − w((1 + ˇ) − ˛
iˇ)
˛i(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛iˇ) , (34)
ei∗
C˜
(w,k) = ˇk − w((1 + ˇ) − ˛
iˇ)
˛iˇ(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛iˇ) . (35)
he problem of the principal can now be written as:
Max
w,k
VC = (1 − p)qL∗C˜ (w,k)y
L∗
C˜
(w,k) + pqH∗
C˜
(w,k)yH∗
C˜
(w,k), (36)
such that:
T ≥ w((1 − p)yL∗
C˜
(w,k) + pyH∗
C˜
(w,k)) + k((1 − p)ˇeL∗
C˜
(w,k) + ˇeH∗
C˜
(w,k)).
(37)
Since the problem is very complex, and closed form solutions are difﬁcult to ﬁnd, we decided to carry out our analysis
umerically, using the same parametrization as in the previous sections, and assuming that ˛L =0.6 and ˛H =0.9, two sym-
etric points in the feasible interval deﬁned by (A.1), and such that ˛L < ¯˛ C˜ ≈ 0.77 < ˛H . In Fig. 6, we compare the utility of
he principal when he offers a standard and a performance based pooling contract – as well as a separating contract, which
e will discuss next – as a function of the share p of motivated agents. For the very same reasons why, in our previous
iscussion, we found that a PFP contract is preferred by the principal if agents are not motivated enough, now we ﬁnd that
his is the case if the distribution of types is “bad enough.” More precisely, we show that there is a threshold level of p, p¯, such
hat if p< p¯ the principal prefers the PFP contract and the standard one otherwise. In our parametrization, p¯ ≈ 0.1, which
mplies that only when the pool of agents is “really bad” the principal will adopt a pay for performance contract.
The reason is that a pay for performance contract can be quite costly, even when the motivated agents are relatively few.
his, in turn, implies that the principal may consider offering separating contracts. Among these, the most natural choice
ould be a menu of two contracts, a performance based {wL, kL}, and a wage only one {wH}, designed in a way that the less
otivated agents choose the former and the more motivated ones the latter. Before proceeding, it is important to notice
hat, in our simple set up if the principal knew the agents’ type, he would confer the entire production to the motivated
Fig. 7. Heterogeneous agents: optimal contract as a function of the share of motivated agents, p. (For interpretation of the references to color in text, the
reader is referred to the web version of the article.)
agents, and the ﬁnal outcome would not depend on their number.16 From (13), in this case,17 the “optimal” contract would
be:
wˆ∗ =
√
T˛H(2 − ˛H)
p
. (38)
We now move to the separating contract that we denote by subscript S. Focusing our attention on linear compensation
contracts, the optimal separating contract {wL∗S , kL∗S ;wH∗S } is the solution of the following problem:
Max
wL
S
,kL
S
,wH
S
VS = (1 − p)yL∗C˜ (w
L
S, k
L
S)q
L∗
S (w
L
S, k
L
S) + pyH∗U˜ (w
H
S )q
H∗
U˜
(wHS ), (39)
such that
T ≥ (1 − p)(wLSyL∗C˜ (w
L
S, k
L
S) + kLSˇeL∗C˜ (w
L
S, k
L
S)) + pwHS yH∗U˜ ,
(40)
UH(wHS ) > U
H(wLS, k
L
S), (41)
UL(wLS, k
L
S) > U
L(wHS ), (42)
where (41) and (42) represent incentive compatibility constraints of the more and less motivated agents, respectively. Of
course, in this set-up, where the principal would like to pay the more motivated agents more (more so if their number is
lower), the only binding incentive compatibility constraint is the one of the less motivated agent, and it is more binding the
larger their number is. The solution of the problem is illustrated in Fig. 7 – while the utility level of the principal offering a
separating contract (vis-à-vis the pooling one) is illustrated in Fig. 6.
From a simple inspection of the ﬁgure, is it evident that, in order to satisfy the less motivated agents’ participation
constraint, the best the principal can do is to reduce the wage it offers to the motivated agent vis-à-vis the constrained
optimal one given by (38). This distortion, which is equal to the difference between the (thick) red and the (thin) black line
in Fig. 7, decreases with p and tends to zero when the share of motivated agents tends to one. This also implies that the
utility of the principal increases with p, but it is always higher than in the case of a pooling contract, see Fig. 6. At the same
time, the compensation of the less motivated agents increases with their number, as they have to make up for the lower
production levels of the high motivated agents.
5. Conclusions
Tight ﬁscal constraints and increased awareness about “citizens’ rights” are pressing governments to ﬁnd innovative
solutions to reform the public administration, cutting on its costs and increasing its “value proposition.” Among these,
the most popular one, advocated by NPM scholars – and NPM oriented consulting ﬁrms – is perhaps that of increasing
investments in managerial and technological solutions and of rationalizing public sector organizations by increasing the
accountability and transparency of their activities.The main driver of such an agenda is the belief that an increase in the measurability of public administration activities
could help addressing those incentive problems that contribute signiﬁcantly to its poor performance. To get a better under-
standing of whether (and under which conditions) this is indeed the case, this paper develops a simple model that looks at
16 Such a result, of course, depends on the very speciﬁc functional forms we selected, but the intuition we derive here is quite general. Indeed, the smaller
is the number of committed agents, the more the principal is willing to pay them so that they would be in charge of a larger share of the production.
17 Using (28) and (31) and assuming yL
U
(w) = 0.
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gents problems.
Our analysis, establishing that the decision of whether to adopt, and how to design, PFP contracts depends on the inter-
ction between agents’ motivations and the quality of the available monitoring and reporting technology, warns against
ne-size-ﬁts-all solutions. More precisely, we show that managerial and technological solutions that allow measuring the
ffort of poorly motivated agents at a reasonable cost, and paying them accordingly, are deﬁnitively part of the solution,
s NPM advocates argue. However, we also show that these solutions become part of the problem, when the contribution
f the different tasks to the creation of value is difﬁcult to measure and/or when agents are committed to the goals of
he organization. In addition, our analysis contributes to the current debate by providing a framework that allows for an
nformed discussion of the impact that investments in monitoring and reporting technologies – such as those that drive
any e-government projects – have on the effectiveness of the PFP schemes and the associated trade-offs.
These ﬁndings can help explaining the mixed results associated with NPM reforms, and they call for a more critical
pproach to the adoption of monitoring and reporting technologies, which pays at least as much attention to agents’
ommitment to public service delivery as to the “measurability” of their daily activities.
ppendix.
. Observable “quality”
The problem of the agent is
Max
y,q
UO = ˛qy + (wy − kq) −

2
(q + y)2, (43)
ith ﬁrst order conditions:
∂UO
∂y
= (˛ − )q − y + w = 0, (44)
∂UO
∂q
= (˛ − )y − q + k = 0. (45)
t is immediate to verify that
y∗O(w,k) =
k(˛ − ) + w
˛(2 − ˛) , (46)
q∗O(w,k) =
w(˛ − ) + k
˛(2 − ˛) , (47)
olve this system. Finally, if (A.1) holds, the Hessian matrix
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂2UO
∂y2
∂2UO
∂y∂q
∂2UO
∂q∂y
∂UO
∂q2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ − ˛ − ˛ −  −
∣∣∣∣ is negative deﬁnite, so that
he second order conditions for a maximum are also veriﬁed.
The principal’s problem can now be written as:
Max
w,k,	
VO = q∗O(w,k)y∗O(w,k), such that:q∗O(w,k) + y∗O(w,k) − T ≤ 0. (48)
ubstituting (46) and (47) into (48), the associated Lagrangian problem can be written as:
Max
w,k,	
£O =
(w(˛ − ) + k)(k(˛ − ) + w)
(˛2 − 2˛)2
+ (a(2kw + T˛) + ((k − w)
2 − 2T˛))	
˛(˛ − 2) , (49)
here 	 denotes the multiplier associated with the budget constraint. The ﬁrst order conditions of the problem are:
∂£O
∂w
= 2w(˛ −  − ˛(2 − ˛)	) + k(˛
2 − 2˛ + 22 − 2˛(2 − ˛)(˛ − )	)
˛2(˛ − 2) = 0, (50)
∂£O 2k(˛ −  − ˛(2 − ˛)	) + w(˛2 − 2˛ + 22 − 2˛(2 − ˛)(˛ − )	)
∂k
=
˛2(˛ − 2) = 0, (51)
∂£O
∂	
= ˛(T˛ + 2kω) + ((k − w)
2 − 2T˛)
˛(˛ − 2) = 0. (52)
It is easy to verify that
w∗O = k∗O =
√
T(2 − ˛)
2
, (53)
	∗O =
1
2(2 − ˛) , (54)
solve this system. Substituting these values in (46) and (47), we have
y∗O = q∗O =
√
T
2(2 − ˛) . (55)
Now, deﬁning by gO, the budget constraint,
gO ≡ (kq∗O(w,k) + wy∗O(w,k) − T) =
˛(T˛ + 2kω) + ((k − w)2 − 2T˛)
˛(2 − ˛) , (56)
we can check that the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
∂gO
∂k
∂gO
∂w
∂gO
∂k
∂2VO
∂k2
∂2VO
∂k∂w
∂gO
∂w
∂2VO
∂w∂k
∂2VO
∂w2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
is equal to 8kw/(˛2(2 − ˛))2
and is positive, which is a sufﬁcient condition for an interior maximum.
2. Unobservable “quality”
The problem of the agent can be written as
Max
y,q
UU = ˛qy + wy −

2
(q + y)2, (57)
with ﬁrst order conditions:
∂UU
∂y
= ( − ˛)q + y − w = 0, (58)
∂UU
∂q
= ( − ˛)y + q = 0. (59)
It is easy to verify that
y∗U(w) =
w
˛(2 − ˛) , (60)
q∗U(w) =
w(˛ − )
˛(2 − ˛) , (61)
solve this system. The Hessian matrix is the same as in the previous case and is negative deﬁnite, so that the second order
conditions for a maximum are veriﬁed. The problem of the principal can now be written as
Max
w
VU = q∗U(w)y∗U(w), such that:wy∗U(w) ≤ T, (62)
but, since the budget is given, and only y is contractible, the only option for the principal is to set
w∗N = T/E[yU(w)]. (63)
Assuming rational expectations, that is, E[yU(w)] = y∗U(w), substituting (63) in (60) and solving, we have that
w∗U =
√
T˛(2 − ˛)

. (64)
Substituting now this expression into (60) and (61), we have that
y∗U =
√
T√ , (65)
˛(2 − ˛)
q∗U =
(˛ − )√T√
˛(2 − ˛)
, (66)
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wnd thus that
V∗U =
T(˛ − )
˛(2 − ˛) . (67)
. Costly observable “quality”
The problem of the agent is:
Max
y,q,e
UC = ˛qy + (wy + kmin{q,ˇe}) −

2
(q + y + e)2. (68)
et ﬁrst assume that, in equilibrium,
ˇe∗ = q∗. (69)
If this is the case, the problem of the agent can be written as:
Max
y,q,e
U˜C = ˛qy + (wy + kq) −

2
(
q + y + q
ˇ
)2
, (70)
ith ﬁrst order conditions:
∂U˜PC
∂y
=
(
˛ − (1 + ˇ)
ˇ
q − y + w = 0, (71)
∂U˜PC
∂q
=
(
˛ − (1 + ˇ)
ˇ
y + (1 + ˇ)
2
ˇ2
q + k = 0, (72)
hich yield
y˜∗C (w,k) =
w(1 + ˇ)2 − kˇ((1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ)
˛iˇ(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ) , (73)
q˜∗C (w,k) =
ˇk − w((1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ))
˛(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ) , (74)
e˜∗C (w,k) =
ˇk − w((1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ))
˛ˇ(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ) . (75)
inally, the Hessian matrix
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∂U˜PC
∂y2
∂2U˜PC
∂y∂q
∂2U˜PC
∂q∂y
∂U˜PC
∂q2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− ˛ − (1 + ˇ)
ˇ

˛ − (1 + ˇ)
ˇ
 − (1 + ˇ)
2
ˇ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
is negative deﬁnite if its determinant,
((2(1 +ˇ)/ˇ)−˛), is positive, which is always the case if condition (A.1) holds, so that the second order conditions for
maximum are veriﬁed.
Substituting (73) and (74) in (70), we obtain:
U˜∗C (w,k) =
2kw˛ˇ2 + (w − ˇ(w − k))2
2˛ˇ(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ) . (76)
he principal’s problem can now be written as
Max
w,k,	
V˜C = q˜∗C (w,k)y˜∗C (w,k), such that:ˇe∗C (w,k) + y˜∗C (w,k) − T ≤ 0. (77)
ubstituting (73)–(75) into (77), the associated Lagrangian problem can be written as:
Max
w,k,	
£˜C =
((kˇ − w(1 + ˇ) − w˛ˇ)(k(˛ˇ2 + (1 + ˇ)(w − kˇ + wˇ))
˛ˇ

+ 
(k
2ˇ2 + w2(1 + ˇ)2 + T(ˇ
 + 2kwˇ(˛ˇ − (1 + ˇ))	
˛ˇ

,
ith ﬁrst order conditions:
∂£˜C w(1 + ˇ)2 + kˇ
∂w
=
˛2ˇ
2
= 0, (78)
∂£˜C
∂k
= kˇ + w
˛2
2
= 0, (79)
∂£˜C
∂	
= k
2ˇ2 + w2(1 + ˇ)2 + T˛ˇ(˛ˇ − 2(1 + ˇ)) + 2kwˇ(˛ˇ − (1 + ˇ)
˛ˇ

, (80)
where 	 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint and
 ≡ −2((2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ)˛	 + (1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ),
 ≡ 2(1 + ˇ)22 + 2˛3ˇ3	 + ˛2ˇ(ˇ − 6(1 + ˇ)	) + 2˛(1 + ˇ)(2(1 + ˇ)	 − ˇ),
 ≡ ˛ˇ − 2(1 + ˇ).
It is then possible to verify that
w˜∗C =
√
T(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ)
2(1 + ˇ) , (81)
k˜∗C =
√
T(1 + ˇ)(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ)
2ˇ2
, (82)
	˜∗C =
ˇ
4(1 + ˇ) − 2˛ˇ , (83)
solve the system (78)–(80). Substituting these values into (73)–(74), and (77) we obtain:
y˜∗C =
√
(1 + ˇ)T
2(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ) , (84)
q˜∗C = ˇ
√
T
2(1 + ˇ)(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ) , (85)
V˜∗C =
Tˇ
2(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ) . (86)
Now, deﬁning by gC the budget constraint,
gC ≡ (kq∗C (w,k) + wy∗C (w,k) − T) =
(w2(1 + ˇ)2 + k2ˇ2 − 2kωˇ((1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ) − ˛ˇT(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ)
˛ˇ(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ) , (87)
we can check that the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0
∂gC
∂k
∂gC
∂w
∂gC
∂k
∂2V˜C
∂w2
∂2V˜C
∂w∂k
∂gC
∂w
∂2V˜C
∂k∂w
∂V˜C
∂w2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
is equal to
(8kwˇ2)/(˛2(2(1 +ˇ) −˛ˇ)2) and is positive, which is a sufﬁcient condition for an interior maximum.
Assume now that, in equilibrium, ˇe* <q*. For this to be the case, we need that at the candidate equilibrium
w˜∗C, k˜
∗
C, y˜
∗
C, q˜
∗
C, e˜
∗
C , the agent has an interest in deviating by choosing (i) e < e˜
∗
C , or (ii) q > q˜
∗
C .
In the ﬁrst case, using (68), the agent’s utility at w˜∗C, k˜
∗
C, y˜
∗
C, q˜
∗
C, e˜
∗
C − ε
}
can be written as:
UˆC = ˛y˜∗C q˜∗C + (w˜∗C y˜∗C + ˇk˜∗C (e˜∗C − ε)) −

2
(q˜∗C + y˜∗C + e˜∗C − ε)2. (88)
Using (81)–(85), a necessary condition for a deviation to be proﬁtable is that
∂UˆC
∂ε
= (w˜
∗
C (1 + ˇ) + ˛ˇε) − 2ε(1 + ˇ)2 − k˜∗Cˇ(2ˇ +  − ˛ˇ)
2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ > 0. (89)
In addition, since
∂2UˆC
∂ε2
< 0, (90)
a necessary condition for (89) to hold is that
lim
ε−→0
∂UˆC
∂ε
= w˜
∗
C (1 + ˇ) − k˜∗Cˇ(2ˇ +  − ˛ˇ)
2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ > 0, (91)or
k˜∗C <
w˜∗C (1 + ˇ)
ˇ(2ˇ +  − ˛ˇ) . (92)
au
I
a
o
w
q
i
wUsing (82), (92), can be written as:
(2 − ˛)
√
(1 + ˇ)T(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ√
2(2ˇ +  − ˛ˇ)
< 0, (93)
contradiction, given (A.1).
In the second case, again, using (68), the agent’s utility at w˜∗C, k˜
∗
C, y˜
∗
C, q˜
∗
C + ε, e˜∗C can be written as
U¯C = ˛y˜∗C (q˜∗C + ε) + w˜∗C y˜∗C + ˇk˜∗C e˜∗C −

2
(q˜∗C + ε + y˜∗C + e˜∗C )2, (94)
sing (81)–(85), a necessary condition for a deviation to be proﬁtable is that
∂U¯C
∂ε
= (w˜
∗
C (1 + ˇ) + ˛ˇε) − 2ε(1 + ˇ)2 − k˜∗Cˇ(2ˇ +  − ˛ˇ)
2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ > 0. (95)
n addition, since
∂2U¯
∂ε2
< 0, (96)
necessary condition for (95) to hold is that
lim
ε−→0
∂U¯C
∂ε
= w˜
∗
C (1 + ˇ) − k˜∗Cˇ(2ˇ +  − ˛ˇ)
ˇ(2(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ > 0 (97)
r
k˜∗C <
w˜∗C (1 + ˇ)
ˇ(2ˇ +  − ˛ˇ) .
hich we just proved is never veriﬁed.
This implies that ˇe<q cannot be an equilibrium. Finally, since is it never in the interest of the agent to increase e above
*/ˇ it is immediate to show that ˇe* >q* can never be an equilibrium. This, in turn, implies that the solution of the problem
s given by ˇe* =q* and that
w∗C =
√
T
2(1 + ˇ) , w
∗
C = w∗U =
√
T˛(2 − ˛)

,
k∗C =
√
T(1 + ˇ)
2ˇ2
, k∗C = 0,
y∗C =
√
T(1 + ˇ)
2
, if ˇ ≥ ¯ˇ ≡ 4(˛ − )
(2 − ˛)2
, y∗C = y∗U =
√
T√
˛(2 − ˛)
, if ˇ < ¯ˇ ,
q∗C =
ˇ
√
T√
2(1 + ˇ)
, (or ˛ ≤ ¯˛ ≡ 2((1 + ˇ) −
√
1 + ˇ)
ˇ
), q∗C = q∗U =
(˛ − )
√
T√
˛(2 − ˛)
, (or ˛ > ¯˛ );
e∗C =
√
T√
2(1 + ˇ)
, e∗C = 0,
∗ Tˇ ∗P ∗ T(˛ − )VC = 2 , VC = VU = ˛(2 − ˛) ,
here ¯˛ C ≡ 2((1+ˇ)−
√
1+ˇ)
ˇ
, ¯ˇ ≡ 4(˛−)
(2−˛)2 , and  ≡2(1+ˇ) −˛ˇ.
Finally, noticing that ˇ > ¯ˇ ⇒  >0, it is immediate to verify that:
∂w∗C
∂˛
= − Tˇ
2
√
2T(1 + ˇ)
< 0,
∂w∗C
∂ˇ
= − T˛
2(1 + ˇ)3/2
√
2T
< 0,
∂k∗C
∂˛
= −T
√
(1 + ˇ)
2
√
2T
< 0,
∂w∗C
∂˛
= − T(˛ − )√
T˛(2 − ˛)
< 0,
∂k∗C
∂ˇ
= −T(4(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ)
2ˇ2
√
2T(1 + ˇ)
< 0,
∂w∗C
∂ˇ
= 0,
∂y∗C
∂˛
= T
2ˇ
√
(1 + ˇ)
(2T)3/2
> 0, if ˇ ≥ ¯ˇ , ∂y
∗
C
∂˛
= T
2(˛ − )
(T˛(2 − ˛))3/2
> 0, if ˇ < ¯ˇ ,
∂y∗C
∂ˇ
= T˛
23/2
√
2(1 + ˇ)T
> 0, (or ˛ ≤ ¯˛ ), ∂y
∗
C
∂ˇ
= 0 (or ˛ > ¯˛ ).
∂q∗C
∂˛
= T
2ˇ2
2(T)3/2
√
2(1 + ˇ)
> 0,
∂q∗C
∂˛
= T
23/2
(T˛(2 − ˛))3/2
> 0,
∂q∗C
∂ˇ
= T(4(1 + ˇ) − ˛ˇ)
2
√
2T((1 + ˇ))3/2
> 0,
∂q∗C
∂ˇ
= 0
∂e∗C
∂˛
= T
2ˇ
2(T)3/2
√
2(1 + ˇ)
> 0,
∂e∗C
∂ˇ
= −T(4(1 + ˇ) − ˛(1 + 2ˇ)
2
√
2T((1 + ˇ))3/2
< 0,
4. Investing in technology
The problem of the principal is to
Max
w,k,	,ˇ
VT = q∗C (w,k)y∗C (w,k) − 	(wy∗C (w,k) + kq∗C (w,k) − ˇ − T), (98)
where q∗C (w,k), y
∗
C(w,k) are given by (73)–(74). The ﬁrst order conditions of the problemare quite cumbersome and available
upon request (as the details for this section). Using Mathematica©, we can show that
w∗T =
√
(2( + T) − T˛)(2( + T) + )√
2˛ + 4( + T)
, (99)
k∗T =
(( + T) + )
√
( − 2( + T))(T˛ − 2( + T))
2T
√
2˛ + 4( + T)
, (100)
ˇ∗T =
2 − 
(˛ − 2) , (101)
with  ≡
√
2(T˛ − 2( + T)) solve the system of ﬁrst order conditions.18 Substituting these values into the principal’s
objective function, we get:
V∗T =
4 − T(˛ − 2) − 
2(˛ − 2)2
. (102)
Comparing now this solution with the solution for the unobservable case, (11), we have thatV∗CT − V∗U =
T(˛ − 2)2 + 4˛ − 2˛
2(˛ − 2)2
, (103)
18 While we have not been able to check analytically that the second order conditions for a maximum are veriﬁed, through numerical simulations we
conﬁrmed that that they are for the parametrization we use in Figs. 3–5.
aW
a
c
R
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
D
D
D
D
F
F
F
G
H
H
H
I
K
L
L
L
M
M
O
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
Wnd
V∗CT − V∗U > 0 ⇔  < ¯ ≡
T(2 − ˛)3
16˛(˛ − ) . (104)
e also implicitly deﬁne
¯˛ ′c ≡ {˛ : V∗CT − V∗U = 0},
nd we can show that V∗CT − V∗U > 0 ⇔ ˛ < ¯˛ ′c .
In addition,
∂¯
∂˛
= T(2 − ˛)
2(22 − 2˛ − ˛2)
16˛2(˛ − )2
< 0 ⇔ ˛ > (
√
3 − 1)
ondition that is always veriﬁed since ˛> .
Finally, to prove Result 3, it is enough to show that
∂ˇ∗t
∂˛
= 
√
2(2(2+T)−T˛)−4
√
((+T)−T˛))
2(a−2)2
√
(2(+T)−T˛) > 0, which is always the case.
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